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OPTIMAL SEQUENTIAL SELECTION BASED ON 
RELATIVE RANKS WITH RENEWABLE CALL OPTIONS 
1982-3 
* JOHNS. ROSE 
Sequential sampling probl ems may be affected significantly by the 
presence of sampling costs and the ability to recall historical obser-
vations. In the context of the classical secretary problem, we incor-
porate these two notions into the decision maker's action set, thereby 
creating a stopped decision process. Whenever a desirable applicant 
appears, we may consider purchasing an option to recall it subsequently. 
The problem is solved for the best-choice criterion , reduced or dis-
counted by the option costs incurred. 
KEY WORDS: Optimal choice; Secretary problem; Costly recall; Stopped 
decision process 
1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
Let us review briefly the context of what we shall refer to as 
the classical model of the secretary problem. Sampling sequentially 
without recall from a finite population of applicants, we must select 
exactly one member. Except for its size, no information about the 
population is available a priori. In order to evaluate the applicants 
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we assume only that ~ur preferences would induce a complete ordering 
on any subset of the population. Thus, at any given stage of .the 
process, the decision to select or to reject an applicant must be 
based solely on its relative rank among those already observed. We 
seek a stopping rule which maximizes the probability of selecting the 
best applicant. Suppose now that we observe an applicant which is 
preferable to the previously sampled, and rejected, applicants. Then, 
this applicant is certainly a candidate for the best. If the candidate 
is selected (rejected), then we risk (not) finding a better applicant 
among those yet unsampled. 
In order to mitigate this risk, we propose extending the classical 
model to allow another decision alternative - purchasing an option to 
call the given candidate at the time of the next observation. If the 
applicant observed at the next stage is better, let the option expire 
and decide among selecting, rejecting, or purchasing an option to call 
the new candidate. Suppose the next applicant is worse. All call 
options are assumed to be renewable, so an identical situation is 
encountered: exercise the option (select the prior candidate), let the 
option expire (reject the candidate), or renew it. Thus, the option 
alternative provides a hedge against the immediate future-. For the 
sake of parsimony, we shall refer to this alternative as the holding 
action. 
Two models, differing only in their reward structures, are 
considered. In the additive cost model, the option price is a fixed 
positive amount. For each stage at whiqh we decide to hold a 
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candidate, that charge is deducted from the expected return. In the 
other model, the expected return is discounted by a positive pr~per 
fraction, raised to a power equal to the number of holding stages. We 
suggest that the discounted · return model may be applicable · in 
s~tuations where, in return for being on ?all, the candidates demand 
an equity interest in our expected reward. 
Detailed analysis of the classical model of the secretary problem 
and several variations thereof·appear in Gilbert and Mosteller (1966). 
The concept of backward solicitation in this setting seems to have 
originated with Yang (1974) and has since been extended by others; see 
Corbin (1980) or Petruccelli (1981). According to Yang's model, we 
may attempt to recall for selection a previously rejected applicant, 
who in turn may refuse our offer with some known probability, in which 
case we are free to select another applicant. There is no cost asso-
ciated with . such solicitation. The essential operational difference 
between Yang's model and ours is that we must decide at the time of 
observation whether or not we shall later have the option to recall 
the candidate. 
Even when recall is available, as in Yang's (1974) model, the 
secretary problem is still a pure stopping problem, provided that no 
penalty is imposed for unsuccessful solicitation. At each stage, the 
decision is either to continue or to (attempt to) stop, and, if the 
latter, then the best available app li cant is so li cited . If the 
solicitation is unsuccessful, then the process continues if!.nyway. 
Because of the holding alternative, our models are more appropriately 
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classified as stopped decision processes, albeit simple ones. Another 
example of a three-action secretary problem is provided by Rubi .n · and 
Samuels (1977) . who suppose that memory capacity is limited. Then, at 
each stage, they must decide among selecting, forgetting, or remembering 
the proffered applicant. However, memory is rent free, and solicitation 
of remembered applicants is not permitted. 
A discounted secretary problem without recall was studied by Ras-
mussen and Pliska (1976) who assume that the final payoff is discounted 
for each stage of the sampling process, while we discount only for the 
holding stages. Also without invoking recall, Lorenzen (1981) inves-
tigates an infinite secretary problem with sampling cost which again 
is a monotone nondecreasing function of the duration of the process. 
However, the payoffs which he considers are fairly general functions 
of the selected candidate's rank, whereas our return is nil unless the 
best is obtained. Dhariyal and Dudewicz (1981) obtain some numerical 
results for the (finite) secretary problem with sampling costs. Un-
fortunately, they did not pursue the limiting behavior of their solu-
tion, which might have provided an interesting comparison to the 
asymptotic results obtained here. 
Our notation and terminology are presented in Section 2. The 
additive .cost model is formulated as a stopped decision process and 
its optimality equations are derived. The solution of the model is 
obtained in Section 3, and its asymptotic behavior is specified in 
Section 4. In section 5, ·we compute the optimal procedure for the 
discounted return model, and in Section 6 the asymptotic solution for 
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large sample size and small discount rate is obtained . Throughout the 
paper, we fou~d it informative if not essential to compare our results 
t o t he cl assical model and its solution . 
2. THE ADDITIVE COST MODEL 
Let cx1 , ---, Xn) be a random permutation of {1 ,---, n}, so 
P(X1=i 1 , ---, Xn=in) = 1/nl · for all permutations (i 1, ·---,i n). We inter-
p r et X as the abso l ute . rank within the enti r e population of the 
r 
applicant observed at stager. After r stages , however, we know only 
the · r elative rankings 
z . = card{i:X.SX., i Sr}, lSjSrSn. (2.1) Jr i J 
Thus, when the j th applicant appears, its relative rank within the 
j - sample is z . . ; and, after an additional r-j observations, its )) 
relative ranking wi thin the r - sample becomes z . • For convenience , we 
Jr 
shall write Z.=Z .. ; obviously, z.sz. , js r. 
J JJ J Jr Note that ·z. is uniform ly Jr 
distributed on {1 ,--~, r} and that the observed history , (z 1, --- ,Zr) , 
and the future, (Z 1 ,---, z ), are independent. r+ n 
There is a unique r andom index, J(r) , such that J( r)Sr and ZJ(r),r 
= 1,r=l,---,n. We shal l .refer to the applicant observed at stage J(r) 
as the candidate for stager. Let A= {pass,hold,stop}, the set of 
actions available at any stage, and l et a €A denote the action taken 
r 
at stager. The candidate for stager is said to be available if 
a = --- = a = hold . If J( r)=r, then z =land the cand ida te is J(r) r - 1 -- r 
available; otherwise , the candidate was held for r-J(r) stages. Let 
Y =1 if the candidate for stager is available; otherwise, l et Y =2, 
r r 
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say. Then, Y is a function of the history, H =(Z 1 ,a 1 ,---,z 1 , · r r . r ·-
a 1 ,z ), through r stages. As we shall see, the process Y={Y ,r=l,---,n} r- r r 
i s a sufficient statistic for the additive cost model. 
The ~odel is formulated as a stopped decision process, which for 
our .. purposes consists of five elements: state space, transition proba-
bilities, terminal reward function, one-stage holding costs, and 
admissible actions. Consider these elements in the order given. Our 
choice of action at stager depends in general on the prior history, 
H , of observed ranks . and actions taken. · However ., as we verify below, 
r 
the probabilities, reward, costs, and admissible actions depend on H 
r 
only through Y. Consequently, it is fairly straightfo rward to show 
r 
that Y is sufficient (cf. Theorem 6.0, p. 3_7, Hinderer (1970), making 
r 
allowance for the optional stopping in our model) for choosing a. 
r 
Thus, the state is given by Y c{l,2}, r=l,---,n. 
r 
Next, the transition probabilities from H xA to H 1 are r r+ . 
trivially ind ependent of Hr. The initial distribution on H1=z1 is 
For any r ealization h of H, with a.i stop, 
· r r J 
j=l,---,r-1, we get p ((h ,a ),(h ,a ,z )) = P(Z 1=z) = 1/(r+l), r r r r r r+ 
provided a i stop. 
r --
for the Y-pr ocess. 
It remains to specify the transition probabilities 
Let p (y,a,x) = P(Y 1=xlY =y,a =a), so r r+ r r 
p
0
({1}) = P(Y1=1) = 1, 
p (y,pass,x) 
r --
= {1/(r+l),x= l 
r/(r+l), x=2 
, yc{l,2}, 
p (1,hold,1) = 1, p (2,hold,x) = p (y,pass,x),r=l,---,n-1. 
r -- -r -- r --
( 2. 2) 
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Now, consider the reward achieved if we decide to stop the pro -
b 1 . h .th 1· . cess at stager y se ecting t e J . app icant. Recall that our objective 
is to select the best applicant , so the terminal reward is defined to 
be P(X.=llH , a = stop). Modifying (2 . 1) slightly , we have X.=Z. =Z. J r r -- J Jn Jr 
+ card{i:X.<Z. ,r<i~n}. Thus, X. depends 
1 Jr . J on H only through z. , r Jr and 
the terminal reward may now be written as P(X.=llz. ) . Clearly , 
J Jr 
X.~z. , so P(X.=llz. ~2) = O; also P(X.=llz. =1) = r/n, independent 
J JI J Jr J Jr 
of j . It follows that we should consider selecting only the candidate 
for stager , and that is feas~ble only if the candidate is available . 
Consequently, the termina l reward, u(• ) , depends only on the state 
Y e:{1 , 2}; 
r 
u (y) 
r 
= {r/n 
Q . I 
I Y"'l 
(2.3) 
y=2 
Specification of the remaining elements of the stopped decision 
·process is easy . The one-stage holding costs depend only on the 
action taken. If ar = hold, a cost , c>O, is incurred. If ar = pass , 
there i s no cost. Finally, the set of admissib l e acts , A , also 
r 
depends on H only through Y . For all r<n, pass e A, while A = 
r r - - r n 
{stop}. There is no point in holding a noncandidate; according to 
(2.3) it shouldn't be selected , according to (2 . 2) it has no effect on 
the arrival of the next candidate, and it is costly. Consequently , we 
sha l l assume that hold e A if and only if Y =1 , r<n . 
r r 
Next, we define the set of p l ans according to which the actions 
{ar} are chosen . Following conventional terminology , an (n- 1) - tuple 
.8 
f = (f --- f ) 
. l' ' n-1 is called a (deterministic, Markov) policy if 
fr:{1,2} ~ {pass, hold}. Invoking our admissibility assumption, we 
shall also require that f (2) = pass. Let -c be any Markov time 
r . 
relative to the sequences (Y1 ,---,Y), r=l,---,n-1, with -c ~ n. The . r 
interpretation is that, if,= r, then a = stop. From (2.3), we may 
r --
also require that {-c=r}C{Yr=l}, r<n. Any pair (f,T) is called a plan. 
r { . Let D denote the set of all plans, and let D = (f, -c)cD:T~r},r=l,---,n. 
For any plan, (f,,)cD, the stochastic evolution and termination of the 
process Y1 ,a 1 ,Y2 ,a 2 ,--- are well defined and satisfy (2.2). Let Pf-c 
and EfT denote the associated probability and expectation1 if no 
ambiguity arises, we shall drop the superscripts. It will be conven-
ient to characterize plans by their support sets for the . holding and 
stopping actions, respectiv~ly. We shall write ambiguously (f,t) = 
(H,B), meaning that -c=min{{r:rcB,Y =l }U{n}} and H = {r :r¢B,f (1) = 
r r 
hold}. Then, BC{l,---,n}, HC{l,---,n-1},BAH = ~, and r¢BUH implies 
We conclude this section with a de sc ription of the total returns 
and the optimality equations. For any plan (f,T)=(B,H)cD, let 
R (f,T) 
r 
n 
=_E [ui(Yi)l{T=i } - clH(r)l{Y.=l}l{T>i}], 
1=r 1 
th 
the return from the r stage on , r=l,---,n. Let 
u (y) = 
r 
max Ef'T[R (f,T) IY =y], 
r r r (f,T)CD 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
the optimal return functions, yc{l,2}. Because Dis finite, the max 
is achieved in (2.5). n For r=n, R (•,•) = u (Y) on D, so U (1) = l 
n n n n 
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and Un(2) = 0. For r<n, let vr = E[Ur+l (Yr+l) lar=pass). Froin (2.2), 
v = u 1 (1)/(r+l) + ru 1 (2)/(r+l). r r+ r+ (2.6) 
At last, the optimality equations are 
U (1) = max{r/n,U 1 (1)~c,v }, r r+ r (2.7) 
and U (2) = v, r=l,---,n-1. 
r r 
Using a standard backward induction argument of dynamic programming, 
we can derive (2.7) directly from (2.3)-(2.5). Otherwise, apply more 
general theory for stopped decision processes, as in Rieder (1975, 
Section 6). The interpretation of (2.7) is certainly clear enough. 
If the candidate for stager is available, we may stop, thereby re-
· ceiving the expected terminal reward r/n, we may hold, paylng the 
holding cost c and moving to stage r+l with the candidate available, 
or we may pass, in which case our expected return is v . According to 
r 
* * the criterion of optimality, (f ,, ) is optimal if and only if it 
* * chooses the maximizing action in (2.7). We may also write {f , , ) = 
* • (H ,B to denote the optimal plan. In order to resolve ties, we 
shall always prefer stopping over passing, which in turn is preferable 
to holding. 
3. SOLUTION OF ADDITIVE COST MODEL 
Suppose that Yr=l and that we are undecided between stop and 
hold. The expected return for stopping is u (l)=r/n. If we hold for, 
. r 
say, k periods and then stop, we expect to receive ur+k(l) = (r+k)./n, 
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for which we pay ck. Thus, if c>-1/n , there seems to be no incentive 
to hold, whereas if c<l/n , then we might as well hold until the 
last stage . This line of reasoning motivates the first two theorems of 
this section . 
First, we introduce some notation fo r the classical model , wi th 
which most of our results will be compared. Frequent use is made of 
the sum 
C(r) = l/r+-- -+ l/(n - 1),r=l,- --, n-l. (3.1 ) 
A very impo rt ant r ole is played by r*, the smallest integer r satisfy ing 
C(r ) ~l. The optimal stopping time for the classica l pro blem i s 
T' = min{ {r: r>-r* , Zr =l} V{n}}, where we adopt a convention of using 
primes (' ) to indicate results computed under the classical model . 
Its optimality equations are Ur ' (1) = max{vr' ,r /n} , r=l , ---, n- 1, where 
vr' = (r/n)C(r) for r~r*-1 and u1 • (1) = v 1 • (1) = --- = v'r*-l. See 
Gilbe rt and Mosteller (1966) or De Groo t (1970 , pp.325-331) fo r 
details. 
T HEOREM 3 .1 If c>-1/n, then the optima l plan is equiva l ent to the 
classical p r ocedu re , i.e., B* = {r* ,---, n} and H* = +. 
PROOF Use backwa r d induction on r, and refer to th e optimality 
equations, (2 .7 ), as necessary. Trivially, neB* . If n~2, t hen n-1>-r* 
and U 1 (1) = max{(n -1 )/n,1-c ,1 /n}=(n -1 )/n. Hence, n-1 £B*. Assume n-
now that {k ,---,n }GB*, k>r*, and consider the case r=k-1. Then, vk_ 1= 
vk-l ~(k -1 )/n and Uk(l) = k/n, so Uk- l (n) = max{(k- 1)/ n,k/n-c} = (k- 1)/ n. 
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Therefore, k-leB*, too, and the theorem holds for r~r*. 
Next, let r=r*-1. Then, vr*-l = v' r*-l = (r*-l)C(r*-1)/n~(r*-1)/n, 
so r*-1¢B*. S~nce r*eB*, U *(1) = r*/n, so U * 1 (1) = max{v , r r - r*-1 
r*/n-c}. We have (r*-1)/n~r*/n-c and C(r*-1)>1, so vr*-l>r*/n-c and 
r*-1 i H*. Now, assume that r ¢ B*,r ¢ H*, for k~r<r*. For r=k-1, we 
have vk-l = Uk(l), by _assumption. Thus, vk_ 1>uk(l)-c. Furthermore, 
vk-l = --- = vr*-l>(r*-1)/n>(k-1)/n. We conclude that k-1 ¢ H*, 
k-1 ¢ B*. D 
THEOREM 3.2 If c<l/n, then B*={n}. Furthermore, r-1£H* implies 
reH*,r<n-1. 
PROOF With c<l/n and n~2, U 1 (1) = 1-c, so n-1¢B*. The induction . n-
hypothesis is that r¢B*,r =k,-~-,n-1. From (2~7), Uk(l)~Uk+l(l)-c~---~ 
1-(n-k)c, so Uk-l (1)~1-(n-k+l)c>l-(n-k+l)/n = (k-1)/n. Th~s, . 
k-1¢B*, and the first assertion is proved. Suppose that the second 
·assertion is false for some r<n-1. Then, we would have u 1 (1)-c>v 1 r- r-
~vr~Ur+l (1)-c, or Ur+l (l)<Ur(l). It is nearly trivial to show that 
U 1 (1)~U (1) for all r, so a contradiction is obtained. r+ r D 
As a consequence of Theorem 3.2, the optimal plan may be simply 
characterized by the single integer, s* = min H*. The first s*-1 
applicants are passed. The first candidate (if any) to appear there-
after is held, and the candidate for each subsequent stage is held, 
until stage n, at which time the candidate is selected. Fortunately, 
it is not difficult to stilve for s*. 
THEOREM 3.3 
C(r-1)~1/cn. 
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With c<l/n, s* is the largest integer r such that 
PROOF On r~s*, we get 
Ur(l) = U (1)-c = ••• = 1-(n-r)c. 
r+l . (3. 2) 
Then, using (2.6), v 1 = U (1)/r+(r-l)v /r, which may be evaluated r- r r 
recursively by applying (3.2) n-r times. We obtain 
v 1 = (r-1) [A (r ,n)-cB (r ,n)), r-
n • n-1 
(3. 3) 
where A.Cr ,n) = E l/(x(x-1)) and B(r,n) = E (n-x)/(x(x-1)). Taking 
x=r x=r 
anti-differences yields A(r,n) = l/(r-1)-1/n and B(r,n) = n/(r-1)-C(r-1)-1. 
By definition, s* is the largest integer r satisfying 
V l ~ U (1)-c. r- r (3.4) 
The theorem is established by substituting (3.2) and (3.3) into (3.4). D 
As a corollary, we see that candidates accepted by the classical procedure 
will always be held in our framework. 
COROLLARY 3.4 If c<l/n, then s*~r*. I n particular, i f c<l/(nC(l)), 
then s*=l, and if c~l/(nC(r*-1)), then s*=r*. 
PROOF From the theorem, C(s*-1).::1/cn>h so C(s*-l)>C(r*), which implies 
C(s*-1).::C(r*-l), and that proves the first assertion. For the rest, 
let r=l and r =r* in the theorem. D 
The maximal expected return is u1 (1) = v 1 = = vs*-l' .which is 
obtained from (3.3) with r=s*-1. It is 
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u 1 (1) = l-c(n-s*)+(s*-1) (cc ·(s*) - 1/n). ( 3. 5) 
·Note that as c+l/n, u1 (1) + (r*-1) C (r* -1) /n = ui (1), the expected _: r e t urn 
from the classical model. I n light of Theorem 3.1 , such behavior is 
expected. Also, as c+O, then u1 (1)+1~ Writing c = y/n, for different 
values of n and y, O<y<l, we have computed s* and u1 (1) numerical i y; 
see Table 1. 
Table 1. Numerical Solution of Additive Cost Model (c<l/n) 
Population 
Size(n) 
5 
25 
100 
1000 
co 
Fraction Cost Optimal 
(y) (c=y/ n ) Plan(s *) 
.1 . 02 1 
.3 . 06 1 
. 7 .1 4 2 
. 9 .18 2-
.1 . 004 1 
. 3 .012 2 
.7 . 028 7 
.9 . 036 9 
.1 .001 1 
.3 . 003 5 
.7 .007 25 
.9 . 009 34 
.1 . 0001 1 
.3 .0003 37 
.7 . 0007 241 
.9 . 0009 330 
.1 s* ::: .00005n 
.3 s* ::: .0357n 
.7 s* ::: .2397n 
.9 s* ::: .3292n 
4 . ASYMPTOTIC SOLUTION, ADDITIVE COST MODEL 
Maximal 
Return(u 1 (1)) 
.92 
.76 
. 5317 
:. 455 
.904 
. 7173 
.4788 
. 4087 
.901 
.7121 
.4704 
.3993 
.9001 
• 7109 
.468 
. 3966 
.9 
.7107 
.4678 
. 3963 
In order to maintain the condition c<l/n as n gets large, let 
c=y/n, O<y<l. 
THEOREM 4.1 The limit a= lim s*/n exists, and a = exp( -1 /y). 
· n+co 
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PROOF From Theorem 3.3, C(s*)<l/cn = 1/L Using an integral approxi -
n 
mation for the sum C(•), we have f *dx/x<C(s*), so log n/s*<l/y , and 
. s 
lim inf s*/n~exp( - 1/y). Also, C(s*-1)~1/y, and we ob t ain similar l y n+00 
liw+$up s*/n~exp(-1/y). D 
The limiting return is now easily obtained from (3.5), with 
lim U1 (1) = 1-y+y exp( -1 /y). n• 00 ( 4 . 1) 
So long as y<l, (4.1) exceeds 1/e, the limit in the c l assical model. 
. . 
Also, by combining Corolla ry (3.4), (3.5), and (4 .1), we get 
Aim iif Ul(l) = 9¼1f Aim Ul(l) = 1/e. The limiting solutions computed 
for several values of y appea r in the last r ows of Tab l e 1. 
5. DISCOUNTED RETURN MODEL 
Now, instead of deducting holding costs from t he terminal r eward , 
as done in (2.4), we multiply the reward by a discount factor, 6,0<6< 1, 
for each stage at which the candidate is held. For (f,T) = (H,B)eD, 
the discounted return functions are 
i-1 
n j~r 1H(j)l{Y·=l} 
R (f,T) = E u.(Y.)1{ ' } 6 ' J , 
r . l. l. T=l. 
. i=r 
(5 . 1) 
r=l, ••• ,n. .The expressions for U (y) and v are still given by (2.5) 
. r r 
and (2.6) respectively, and Ur(2) = vr' as before. The optimality 
equations become 
U (1) = max{r/n,eu 1(1),v }, 
r .r+ r (5. 2) 
r =l,---, n- 1, and these can be rigorously derived by adapting the usual 
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inductive argument to fit the discounted model. 
The first t heorem and its lemmas provide a convenient and useful 
characterization of the optimal stopping rule. From L_emma 1, we find 
that no candidate should be selected if it is rejected in the classical 
model. Let t* = min B*, the first stage at which an available 
candidate should be selected. 
LEMMA 5.1 The optima~ stopping time has the lower bound, T*~r•. 
PROOF Obviously, v ~v• for all r. Suppose that t*<r*. From (5.2), 
r r 
the optimality of T*, and the definition of r*, we get t*/n~v ~v• = 
t* t* 
v 1 >(r*-1)/n so t*>r*-1 a contradiction. 
r*-1 ' ' D 
LEMMA 5.2 The optimal stopping set is connected; B* = {t*,t*+l, ••• ,n}. 
PROOF Show that r+leB* follows from reB*. We rely on (5.2). If reB*, 
then r/n~8U 1 (1)~8{r+l)/n, so r+ 
8Sr/(r+l). (5. 3) 
Suppose now that r+liB*. Because neB*, th ere exists an integer k, 
k~r+l, such that k¢'B* and k+leB*. Furthermore, since v.~v. 1 for all l. 1.+ 
i, we -get k/n>r/n=U {l)~v ~vk. It follows that keH*, the optimal 
r r 
holding set, so Uk(1)=8Uk+l (1)=8(k+l)/n>k/n. Thus, 8>k/{k+l), 
which violates (5.3). 0 
THEOREM 5.3 Let k be the unique positive integer which satisfies 
(k-1)/k<8Sk/(k+l). Then, · 
t• = ff , 'kSr* r*<k<n 
,. k~n 
(5.4) 
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and t* is monotone nondecreasing in a. 
PROOF Suppose that t* =t, with r*<t<n. Then, t-ltB*, and U 1 (1)= t-
max{8t/n, vt~ 1}>(t-1)/n. From Lemma 5.2,vt_ 1=v~_ 1, so vt-l = (t-l)C(t-1)/n 
and C(t-l)SC(r*)Sl. Thus, vt_ 1s(t-1)/n, so Ut-l (l)=St/n>(t-1)/n; 
hence, S>(t-1)/t. That 6St/(t+l) follows from (5.3). Now, suppose 
that 6Sk/(k+l), k~r•. If t>r*, then the preceding argument gives a 
contradiction. From Lenuna 5.1, we conclude that t=r*. Finally, if 
S>(n-1)/n, then Un-l (l)=max{(n-1)/n,6,1/n} = a, so n-lcH*. Since 
B* is connected, t*=n. 0 
Now, we proceed to investigate the optimal holding set,. H*; it, 
too, is connected. 
LEMMA 5.4 If r-lcH*, then rcH* ,r=2, •• :, t* -1. 
PROOF By hypothesis, ~r-l (1} = aur(l)>vr-i· Because r<t*, U (1) = 
r 
max{Sur+l(l),vr}. Suppose that Ur(l} = vr' meaning f;(l) = pass. 
~hen, av >v 1, and v 1 = U (1)/r+(r-l)v /r = vr' from which we r r- r- r r 
conclude 6>1. 
As before, lets*= min H*. The next theorem shows how_ to 
~I 
D 
computes*, but we can now describe the optimal plan. Pass the first 
s*-1 applicants and hold the . first candidate, if any, observed at a 
stage betweens* and t*-1, inclusive. Hold the candidate until stage 
t*, when it will then be selected, or until it is superseded at some 
stage prior tot* by yet another candidate, which should also be held. 
Beginning with stage t*, stop and select the first available candidate. 
17 
THEOREM 5.5 For a ll rcH*, 
t*-1 
(rt*/n) E 
i=r+l 
t*-i · t*-r S /i(i-l)+(r/n)C(t* -1 ) < 8 t*/n. (5.5) ' 
PROOF If rcH*, then {r+l,r+2,--~,t* -l }CH*, by the preceding ienuna, so 
U (1) = SU (1) = S2u (1) = ••• = et*-ru (1) = st*~rt*/n , the 
r r+l r+2 t* 
right side of (5.5). Substituting for U. (1) in (2.6) , we evaluate v 
r 
recursively, 
t*-1 
(rt*/n) E 
i=r+l 
obtaining v = t*St*-(r+l) /(n(r+l))+rv 
1
/(r+l) = 
r r+ 
t*-i . 
B /i(i-l)+ryt*-l/(t"'-1). Now, vt*-l = v~*-l = 
= 
( t *-1))1' 
C(t* -1) /n, so v equals the left .side of (5.5). 
r 
For rcH*, we must 
have v <U (1), which is (5.5) . 
r r D 
Then, s* is simply the smallest positive integer, r, for which (5.5) 
holds. Of course, there is no assurance that H*#~. If the terminal 
reward is too deeply discounted, we may never want to hold a candidate. 
THEOREM 5.6 The optimal holding set is null if and only if 
8 S min{(r*-l)C{r*-1)/r*,r*/(r*+l)}. (5. 6) 
PROOF If H*=~, then the optima l .plan is the classical procedure, with 
t*=r*. By Theorem 5.3, SSr*/(r*+l). Furthermore, Ur*-l (l) = v;._ 1 = 
(r*-l)C(r* -1 )/n~SU *(1) = 8r*/n, and (5.6) holds. On the other hand, 
r 
if (5.6) holds, then t*=r*, by Theorem 5.3 . According to Lemma 5.4, 
if H*#~, then r*-lEH*. However, substituting r=r* - 1 and t*=r* into 
(5.5) contradicts (5.6). We conclude that H*=~. D 
The next proposition complements Lemma 5.1 and asserts that we 
should never reject a . candidate which would be selected under the 
cla .ssical model. 
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PROPOSITION 5.7 If H*/¢, then s*<r*. 
PROOF The proof is by induction on k, as given in Theorem 5.3. 
Suppose first that k=r*, so t*=r*. If H*/¢, the previous theorem sti-
pulates that S>(r*- l )~(r*-1)/r*, so r=r*-1 satisfies (5.5) and s*<r*. 
Now, assume that r*-lcH* for t*=r*,---,k, and consider the case 
t*=k+l. Rewriting (5.5) slightly, and letting r=r*-1, the induction 
hypothe.sis becomes 
k 
r Sr-i/i(i-l)+Sr-k~(k)/k < 1/r, (5. 7) 
i =r+l 
(k-1)/k<S~k/(k+l). Then (5.5) will hold with t*=k+l provided that 
(5.8) 
for _ l>A>k/(k+l)~S. The left (right) side of (5.8) is continuous and 
decreasing in A (S), so it is sufficient to consider A=S=k/ (k+l) ,. 
which yields equality in (5.8). D 
As S inc~eases, there is less discount and we should be more inclined 
to hold the candidate for any given stage. Use the notation H*(•) to 
denote explicitly the dependence of the optimal holding set on the 
discount factor. 
PROPOSITION 5.8 If A>S, then H*(S)CH*(A). 
PROOF Let rcH*(S) and essentially replicate the argument of the 
previous proposition to verify also that rcH*(A). D 
Writing S=(n-L)/n, the numerical solution to the discounted return 
model is displayed in Table 2 for certain values of n and L. For 
comparative purposes, we also provide there the solution to the 
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classical model. 
Table 2. Numerical Solution qf -Discounted Return Model(S=(n - L)/n) 
Pop'n Discount Factor Optimal Solution Classica l Solution 
Size(n) (L) (8) s* t* U~(l) r* U!(l)' 
5 .1 .98 1 5 . 224 3 • 333 
.5 . 9 1 5 .6561 
1 .8 2 . 4 .4793 
2 .6 3 3 . 4333 
2.5 .5 3 3 .4333 
25 .1 .996 1 25 .9083 lO .3809 
. 5 :98 3 25 . 6299 
1 .96 6 24 .4536 
2 .92 10 12 .3817 
2.5 . 9 10 10 .38 09 
100 .1 .999 1 100 .9057 38 .3710 
. 5 .995 7 100 .6270 
1 . 99 21 99 .4502 
2 . 98 36 49 .3 728 
2.5 . 975 38 39 .3710 
1000 . 1 .9999 1 1000 .9 049 369 • 3682 
. 5 .9995 64 1000 .6261 
1 . 999 201 999 .4 493 
2 .998 350 499 .3702 
2.-5 .9975 367 399 .3682 
0) 
.1 . OOOln n .9 048 .3679n .3 679 
.5 .0634n n .6261 
1 .1 998n n .4492 
2 .3493 n .Sn .3700 
2.5 .3665n .4n . 3679 
6. ASYMPTO~IC SOLUTION, DISCOUNTED RETURN 
In view of Theorem 5. 6 , as n gets large, we must also allow 8 to 
approach unity; otherwise , the c l assical solution is obtained. Subse -
quent ana l ysis is facil i tated if we assume that n(l-8) converge t o a 
positive limit, say L, and for simplicity we write 8 = 8(n) = (n-L)/n. 
The solution is surprisingly extremely sensitive to L , as we shall 
see. From Theorem 5.3, we get 
ti
le 
lim t*/h ~ /L 
n+co 1 
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, L>e 
, e2:L.::l 
, L<l. 
(6.1) 
Henceforth, we shall require L~e, .and let u = lim t*/n = min{l,1/L}. 
n+co 
We want to examine the limiting behavior of s* = s*(n). Consider 
first the case e2:L2:l. Letµ= lim inf s*/n. Also , let r = s* and 
n+co 
t = t* in (5.5), and take the limit. Dealing first with the 
t-1 t-i t t-x 2 2 
summation, we get (rt/n) E 18 /i(i-1)>(8rt/n) f 18 .ax/x = (8rt/n )~ 1.=r+ r+ 
t/n t-ny 2 
cf+l)/n 8 dy/y, to which we may apply Fatou's lemma. First note 
that 8t = [(1-L/n)n/L]t L/n + 1/e, while 8-ny = [(1-L/n)n/L]-yL + 
exp(yL)°, as n+<lo. Thus, 
t-1 · 
lim inf(rt/n) E 
n+co i=r+l 
Integrating by parts, we get 
u 2 f exp(yL)dy/y = exp(µL)/µ - e/u + LI(µ,u), µ 
b 
(6. 2) 
(6.3) 
where I(a,b) = f exp(y/b)dy/y. For the second term on the left side of 
a . 
(5.5), we have C(t-1) = nEl 1/i ~ f~ dx/x ~ -log u, so 
i=t-1 
lim inf (r/n)C(t-1) =-µlog u. 
n+co 
(6.4) 
Finally, we have lim in f 8-r = lim inf[(l-L/n)n/L)-rL/n = exp(µ/u), so 
n+00 n+co 
lim inf 8 t-rt/n = u exp (µ/u-1) , (6. 5) 
n+co 
the limit of the right side of (5.5). Combini'ng (5.5) with (6.2)-(6.5), 
we get I(µ,u)/e-log u~l. Now, let r = s*-1 in (5 .5), thereby reversing 
the inequality. Letµ= lim sup s*/n and modify the preceding argument 
n+oo 
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appropriately. We obtain I(µ , u)/e-logu~l. Since I(•,v) is monotone 
decreasing on (0,v], it follows that I(µ,u)SI(µ,u) . Hence, we have proved 
THEOREM 6.1 For 8 = 1-L/n, lSLSe, the limitµ= lim s*/n ex ists and 
n+~ 
satisfies 
(~/e) f~ ·exp(y/u)dy/y - log v = 1 (6.6) 
In order to computeµ .from (6.6), we may expand I(µ,v) a~ a cower 
series, I(µ,v) = -lo g(µ/u)+ k~l (1-(w~)kl/(kkl), and include as many 
terms as necessary to achieve a desired level of accuracy . The last 
portion of Table 2 gives selected values to four decimal p la ces. 
Now, return to (5.5) and evaluate the limiting return. We eas i-
ly obtain JJ.W u1 (1) = J+~m vs*-l = v exp( -1+µ/ ~), which ·we rewrite as 
lim Ul(l) = V exp(-L(u-µ)), 
n+~ 
(6.7) 
~nd (6.7) holds for the case L<l as well as lSLSe. 
The corollary indicates that the classical procedure is a good 
approximation for the optimal plan when 8Sl-e/n. 
COROLLARY 6.2 If e = 1-L/n, L~e, then him s*/n = fi¼fil u1 (1) ~ 1/e. 
PROOF Let L=e in (6.6). Then, v=l/e, so -log u=l; thus, I(u,u)=0. 
The integr and is positive, so µ=u. Now, substitute u=µ=l/e in (6.7), 
and obtain u1 (1)zl/e, too. For L>e, just apply Proposition 5.8. D 
There remains the case L<l. Analysis s imilar to that yielding 
Theorem 6.1 gives 
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exp(-L)L ~1exp(yL)dy(y = 1, (6.8) 
where againµ= lim s*/n. The strategy of always holding the candidate 
n+oo 
is a good approximation to the optimal plan when S~l-L/n and Lis 
nearly zero. · The following corollary follows almost immediately from 
( 6. 7) and · ( 6. 8) • 
COROLLARY 6.3 For S = 1-L/n, lim 
L+0 
lim s*/n = 0 and lim lim u1 (1) = 1. n+oo L+0 n~ 
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